
***This post is a continuation of PART ONE: “China’s Environmental Crisis,” by Kenneth Lieberthal.***
Kenneth Lieberthal, visiting fellow at The Brookings Institution, spoke last night about “China’s Environmental Crisis and Prospects for the Future” at the The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of Johns Hopkins University in Washington, D.C.
Despite all the grim statistics about China’s environment, there have been efforts to ameliorate the problem.
“If you think the Chinese government is not concerned with the environment and sustainability, you are out-of-date,” Lieberthal says.
The country plans to spend $175 billion on environmental alleviation during its 11th Five-Year Plan period.
And the recent economic stimulus package also includes “11 billion [yuan] for environmental protection projects,” heard via the China Environmental Law blog, mostly likely involving water and solid waste treatment.
But none of this will be easy, Lieberthal says, pointing out the five biggest obstacles that all countries face in dealing with global environmental degradation and climate change:
China, in particular, has some unique hurdles to jump.
Lieberthal describes what he calls “the deal” to explain China’s five-level political system, which includes administrative powers at the “Center” (i.e. Beijing), branching out to the provincial, city, county, township and village levels.
Under this system, performance is predominantly measured by annual growth in GDP. So, local leaders, who are entrenched in the so-called “cadre reward system,” are motivated by the fact that if China’s GDP grows, then their own prospect for promotion and acquiring personal wealth improves.
While it’s easy to mobilize resources to build more stuff (”there is no place in the world that builds physical products better than China,” Lieberthal says), it’s difficult to enforce any laws or regulations that constrain short-term growth. Afterall, the logic goes, why stunt GDP growth if it means risking your own professional and personal success?
Even if an enterprise coughs up a fine to the municipal government for breaking some environmental regulation, the government will often “make up those funds” through subsidies or additional investments, in order to maintain production and spur more growth. In other words, “everyone’s doing what they’re supposed to do,” Lieberthal says, and there’s no “real cost” of violating the law.
It’s like “putting the fox in charge of the chicken coop,” he adds.
But that’s not really helping anyone, is it?
China’s legal system does not allow for a vigorous “green” NGO movement, because every time an organization gets political, it runs into trouble.
But “you can’t count on governments to change that much,” Lieberthal says. “It takes outside pressure to get it done.”
He puts forth the idea of creating a “Green Corps,” like the “Peace Corps,” but instead of, say, volunteering for AIDS education in rural Africa, you’d be retrofitting cars and building energy-efficient homes in urban China. Sign me up!
China’s got a lot of coal but, in general, lacks other energy sources. Yes, there have been serious efforts to develop wind, solar, nuclear, and hydropower energy, Lieberthal says, but they are riddled with problems:
China is going to have to rebuild older, failing cities or change the way new cities are constructed, considering facts like this:
To recap:
Severe water scarcity.
Dismal water quality.
Melting ice masses. Rising sea levels. Declining agricultural output. Unpredictable weather patterns. Vulnerable vegetation.
This is a crisis. (Read PART ONE for more info.)
In a Sino-U.S. relations context: “The issue of climate change is going to be one of the key issues shaping the U.S.-China relationship,” Lieberthal says.
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